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Volume 37, Issue 4 (2022)
GeoRes 2022, 37(4): 549-556 |
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Received: 2022/08/24 | Accepted: 2022/11/11 | Published: 2022/11/1
Received: 2022/08/24 | Accepted: 2022/11/11 | Published: 2022/11/1
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Safaeipour Z, Sarvar R, Ghorbanenejhad R. Analysis of Organizational Structures in Tehran Metropolitan Privacy Construction Processes based on Game Theory Approach. GeoRes 2022; 37 (4) :549-556
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1- Department of Geography, Faculty of Literature, Humanities and Social Sciences, Science and Research Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran
2- Department of Geography, Science and Research Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran
2- Department of Geography, Science and Research Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran
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Introduction
Institutions structure the underlying incentives embedded in human interactions whether political, economic, or social. In a general sense, institutions encompass beliefs, behaviors (rational or non-rational), traditions, and legal norms and regulations that, when organized around a core principle, form a coherent system. In this regard, sound institutions function as creators of an incentive structure that reduces uncertainty, promotes efficiency, and thereby contributes to improved economic performance [Issazadeh & Ahmadzadeh, 2015]. Although no universally accepted definition of institutions exists, many scholars of the new institutional school consider institutions as rules and norms [Menard & Shirley, 2014] and define them as the “rules of the game.”
Urban structure theories seek to explain the city’s formation based on the key driver of growth. One of the fundamental and influential contexts necessary for building coalitions and achieving consensus among institutional, social, economic, and political components of urban society around this central growth driver is the production of rent-seeking space, designed to capture land rent, known as the rentier structure of the city. The main theoretical approaches that explain the production of rent-seeking space and the consequent urban structure around the axis of growth include the elitist perspective, the pluralist perspective, the growth coalition theory, and public choice theory [Taherkhani, 2018].
Given the limitations of traditional methods, a new approach that can overcome their deficiencies, one that enables transparent and reliable prediction of available alternatives, employs operational tools for evaluating these options based on both quantitative and qualitative factors, and prioritizes collective over individual benefits, is essential. In this regard, applying game theory can partially mitigate the challenges associated with traditional decision-making methods. The game-theoretic approach serves as an effective framework for decision-making and resolving various issues and disputes in construction-related projects [Shakiba Barougha et al., 2012]. Game theory is a mathematics-based approach for studying social interactions and modeling strategic situations [Samsura et al., 2010], focusing on competitive and cooperative behaviors among individuals [Safaei & Malek Mohammadi, 2014]. Consequently, it has been considered part of decision-making theory [Samsura et al., 2010] and referred to as an “interactive decision-making theory” [Tan et al., 2015].
Game theory is commonly classified based on six criteria: (1) static vs. dynamic games; (2) presence of conflicting interests or potential for cooperation; (3) number of iterations; (4) information structure; (5) constancy or variability of the game; and (6) cooperative vs. non-cooperative nature. With the expansion of conflicts in number and complexity, various game-theoretic models have been developed. These models, depending on the number of players, available options, and whether players’ preferences are quantitative or qualitative, are categorized into quantitative (numeric preferences) and qualitative (relative preferences) approaches [Kilgour & Hipel, 2001]. In any game or conflict, decision-makers may pursue different goals, leading to three distinct perspectives: (1) forward-looking; (2) behavioral; and (3) reverse [Alian et al., 2018].
Graph model methodology, a subset of game-theoretic approaches, introduces key components of a game (players, preferences, actions, etc.) into the analysis through a simple and unique structure. Using this method and its accompanying software system, GMCR, complex strategic conflicts can be analyzed, and decisions can be made to resolve them [Kilgour & Hipel, 2005]. The graph model belongs to the category of non-cooperative games with complete information [Zoghi et al., 2014].
Urban management does not end at administrative boundaries. Therefore, to effectively govern urban affairs, a surrounding buffer zone must be placed under the supervision of planners, as cities influence their surrounding territory and are, in turn, influenced by changes occurring within it [Afsharnia & Mirzadeh, 2016]. Defining and determining this buffer zone (known as the city’s extraterritorial jurisdiction or harim) is a formal and legal instrument for directing and controlling development and regulating construction around the city [Berakpour et al., 2012]. The harim is thus a designated boundary encircling a specified area around the city, preventing unauthorized development and preserving surrounding natural landscapes and wildlife [Akbari et al., 2017].
Managing the harim of the Tehran metropolis constitutes one of the most critical challenges in this domain [Sarvar & Bafrani, 2019]. The current boundary of Tehran’s harim encompasses a large portion of Tehran Province, making it unique compared to other cities in the country. Specifically, Tehran’s harim includes more than 22 cities and 413 towns, villages, and settlements [Nasirian & Basirat, 2022]. Accordingly, this study seeks to use a game-theoretic approach to analyze institutional structures in construction-related processes within the harim of the Tehran metropolis.
Methodology
This study is classified as an applied–developmental research in terms of purpose and as a documentary–survey research in terms of nature and method. The research was conducted in 2022 within the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Tehran metropolis. The graph-based modeling and conflict analysis process consists of two main stages: modeling and conflict analysis.
In the first stage, the required information was collected through a documentary review of articles, plans, and all studies related to construction stakeholders in the metropolitan fringe. These materials were obtained from databases such as Scopus, Web of Science, Magiran, SID, Irandoc, and Noormags, as well as the search engines Google and Google Scholar. The study population consisted of actors involved in construction activities in the metropolitan fringe, including managers and experts from relevant organizations. The research began with purposive sampling and continued with theoretical sampling, resulting in 20 interviews.
The credibility and dependability of the results were ensured using the Guba and Lincoln method. Four criteria including credibility, dependability, confirmability, and transferability were examined. To enhance data validity, various strategies such as participant validation and peer debriefing were applied. Data analysis was performed using content analysis. From the total set of identified states, those that were impossible to occur were removed, and the states each decision-maker could reach from any initial state were determined. The possible states of the conflict were then ranked according to the actors’ preferences.
After completing the modeling process, the second stage involved using the results in the GMCR+ software. In this stage, stable states were identified for each group of actors, followed by the equilibrium points (probable outcomes) of the conflict. The actors involved in construction activities within the metropolitan fringe were classified into three main groups: (1) policy-making institutions; (2) supervisory institutions; and (3) executive institutions.
Findings
Actors and Their Possible Options
The components of the conflict model in the graph-based approach included the fringe-construction actors, their possible options, and their preferences. In all tables of the results section, the selection of an option by an actor is indicated as “Yes,” and the non-selection as “No.” Based on the final refined options for actors involved in construction within the metropolitan fringe, the total theoretical number of game states equals2 9 =512
Identification of Feasible States
Not every theoretically possible state can occur in reality, as several limitations reduced the number of valid states. Thus, combinations in which options cannot coexist were removed, as well as cases where each actor was required to select at least one of its options, or cases in which one action is conditional upon another.
After applying incompatibility conditions and the requirement of selecting at least one option in the GMCR+ software, the infeasible states were identified. Removing these states reduced the total number of feasible conflict states to 42.
Prioritizing Feasible States for Each Actor
The final step in modeling was ranking the feasible states for each decision-maker using the option-prioritization method. After entering these preferences into the software, the feasible states were ranked for all actors, and their validity was confirmed.
Determining Stable States
After constructing the model, the final outcomes were predicted based on stability and equilibrium analyses. A state was considered an equilibrium if it is stable for all actors. Such states represented the most probable outcomes of the conflict.
Summary of Equilibrium States
The conflict included several equilibrium states. The most important are summarized below:
State 4
According to the Nash stability, general metarationality, symmetric metarationality, sequential stability, limited-move stability, and farsighted stability criteria, State 4 was a stable equilibrium.
This state reflected the status quo: All actors maintain current practices. The only distinction was that supervisory institutions did not remain indifferent to land-use changes in the fringe area. One practical reason for the failure of reforms was that all actors remained stable in the current configuration and therefore had no incentive to move away from the existing situation.
State 19
Also considered an equilibrium under all stability criteria.
Similar to State 4, but with two differences:
A stable equilibrium under all logics of stability. However, this state provided minimum benefits for supervisory institutions.
States 32 and 37
Both states were equilibrium under all stability logics. They differed in terms of:
State 38 (Optimal Equilibrium)
This was the most beneficial state for all actors, meeting all stability criteria.
In this state:
States 3, 13, 14, 18, 35, and 36
These were equilibrium under general and symmetric metarationality. They represented moderately forward-looking states characterized by risk aversion and strategic retreat.
Discussion
The present study was conducted with the aim of analyzing institutional structures governing construction processes in the fringe of the Tehran metropolis based on a game-theoretic approach. In urban fringe areas, unregulated construction activities and in some cases the proximity of rural settlements to urban and peri-urban zones [Brohi et al., 2018] have led to the degradation of surrounding lands [Zhang et al., 2011] and severe land-use changes [Sorace & Hurst, 2015]. Consequently, such patterns of growth contribute to the outward expansion of cities and the encroachment upon and degradation of urban boundaries [Sobhani et al., 2019].
Two principles should be acknowledged in fringe development: preventing the conversion of natural lands into artificial environments, and ensuring that any limited construction contributes to environmental enhancement and the improvement of ecological capacities. In Iran, the system for directing and controlling urban construction is shaped by social, legal, and planning structures. Accordingly, construction governance is formed through: (1) various plans and planning documents, and (2) legal and financial instruments of urban planning [Moshiri, 2011].
By outlining and applying game theory to institutional structures of construction governance, this study not only addressed the complexity created by the multiplicity of actors, but through modeling, it analyzed their behaviors, interactions, and preferences to identify the implications of their strategic decisions. Game theory not only offers insights into interactive decision-making in strategic interactions but can also identify optimal pathways using graph theory, allowing all players to achieve maximum relative benefits [Lee, 2012].
The modeling results indicate that among the 42 feasible states, six equilibrium states and six semi-stable states emerged. State 38 was identified as the most stable configuration among actors involved in construction processes in the Tehran metropolitan fringe. In this state, all actors achieve maximum utility. Specifically:
– Policy-making institutions achieve structural reforms, gradual changes, and the need for revising regulations aligned with coordinated and efficient management of fringe policies;
– Regulatory institutions ensure control of urban development, prevention of unauthorized construction, and mitigation of informal expansion relative to current fringe policies;
– Executive institutions ensure continuous involvement of competent executors in construction processes within deteriorated urban areas and underutilized lands, fully implementing redevelopment and contributing to the governance of Tehran’s metropolitan fringe.
The findings indicate that the desirability, stability, and equilibrium envisioned for the metropolitan fringe are not evident in the current landscape of actors and their interactions. Achieving a preferred state, one that satisfies the priorities and preferences of stakeholders, requires fundamental and challenging actions.
The state identified as the most stable equilibrium depends on structural reforms and a clear conceptualization of fringe construction within Iran’s political–administrative system, supported by the collaboration of other influential institutions. Consistent with the results of this study, Alian et al. [2018; 2019], Falahati et al. [2017], and Shakkiba et al. [2020] have also emphasized the need for structural reforms in order to modify stakeholder preferences.
Conclusion
Coalitional analyses of the institutions indicate that achieving an institutional structure in this metropolis that maximizes the interests of all actors requires fundamental structural reforms. Such reforms must be oriented toward environmental protection, enhanced coordination capacity, alignment with higher-level planning documents, capacity building, and the active participation of stakeholders.
Acknowledgments: None to declare.
Ethical Permission: No ethical issues to report.
Conflicts of Interest: This article is derived from the first author's doctoral dissertation, supervised by the second author and advised by the third author at the Science and Research Branch of Islamic Azad University.
Authors’ Contributions: Safaeipour Z (First Author), Principal Researcher/Discussion Writer (50%); Sarvar R (Second Author), Methodologist/Introduction Writer (25%); Ghorbanenejhad R (Third Author), Methodologist/Statistical Analyst (25%)
Funding: This research was conducted with the authors’ personal financial resources
Institutions structure the underlying incentives embedded in human interactions whether political, economic, or social. In a general sense, institutions encompass beliefs, behaviors (rational or non-rational), traditions, and legal norms and regulations that, when organized around a core principle, form a coherent system. In this regard, sound institutions function as creators of an incentive structure that reduces uncertainty, promotes efficiency, and thereby contributes to improved economic performance [Issazadeh & Ahmadzadeh, 2015]. Although no universally accepted definition of institutions exists, many scholars of the new institutional school consider institutions as rules and norms [Menard & Shirley, 2014] and define them as the “rules of the game.”
Urban structure theories seek to explain the city’s formation based on the key driver of growth. One of the fundamental and influential contexts necessary for building coalitions and achieving consensus among institutional, social, economic, and political components of urban society around this central growth driver is the production of rent-seeking space, designed to capture land rent, known as the rentier structure of the city. The main theoretical approaches that explain the production of rent-seeking space and the consequent urban structure around the axis of growth include the elitist perspective, the pluralist perspective, the growth coalition theory, and public choice theory [Taherkhani, 2018].
Given the limitations of traditional methods, a new approach that can overcome their deficiencies, one that enables transparent and reliable prediction of available alternatives, employs operational tools for evaluating these options based on both quantitative and qualitative factors, and prioritizes collective over individual benefits, is essential. In this regard, applying game theory can partially mitigate the challenges associated with traditional decision-making methods. The game-theoretic approach serves as an effective framework for decision-making and resolving various issues and disputes in construction-related projects [Shakiba Barougha et al., 2012]. Game theory is a mathematics-based approach for studying social interactions and modeling strategic situations [Samsura et al., 2010], focusing on competitive and cooperative behaviors among individuals [Safaei & Malek Mohammadi, 2014]. Consequently, it has been considered part of decision-making theory [Samsura et al., 2010] and referred to as an “interactive decision-making theory” [Tan et al., 2015].
Game theory is commonly classified based on six criteria: (1) static vs. dynamic games; (2) presence of conflicting interests or potential for cooperation; (3) number of iterations; (4) information structure; (5) constancy or variability of the game; and (6) cooperative vs. non-cooperative nature. With the expansion of conflicts in number and complexity, various game-theoretic models have been developed. These models, depending on the number of players, available options, and whether players’ preferences are quantitative or qualitative, are categorized into quantitative (numeric preferences) and qualitative (relative preferences) approaches [Kilgour & Hipel, 2001]. In any game or conflict, decision-makers may pursue different goals, leading to three distinct perspectives: (1) forward-looking; (2) behavioral; and (3) reverse [Alian et al., 2018].
Graph model methodology, a subset of game-theoretic approaches, introduces key components of a game (players, preferences, actions, etc.) into the analysis through a simple and unique structure. Using this method and its accompanying software system, GMCR, complex strategic conflicts can be analyzed, and decisions can be made to resolve them [Kilgour & Hipel, 2005]. The graph model belongs to the category of non-cooperative games with complete information [Zoghi et al., 2014].
Urban management does not end at administrative boundaries. Therefore, to effectively govern urban affairs, a surrounding buffer zone must be placed under the supervision of planners, as cities influence their surrounding territory and are, in turn, influenced by changes occurring within it [Afsharnia & Mirzadeh, 2016]. Defining and determining this buffer zone (known as the city’s extraterritorial jurisdiction or harim) is a formal and legal instrument for directing and controlling development and regulating construction around the city [Berakpour et al., 2012]. The harim is thus a designated boundary encircling a specified area around the city, preventing unauthorized development and preserving surrounding natural landscapes and wildlife [Akbari et al., 2017].
Managing the harim of the Tehran metropolis constitutes one of the most critical challenges in this domain [Sarvar & Bafrani, 2019]. The current boundary of Tehran’s harim encompasses a large portion of Tehran Province, making it unique compared to other cities in the country. Specifically, Tehran’s harim includes more than 22 cities and 413 towns, villages, and settlements [Nasirian & Basirat, 2022]. Accordingly, this study seeks to use a game-theoretic approach to analyze institutional structures in construction-related processes within the harim of the Tehran metropolis.
Methodology
This study is classified as an applied–developmental research in terms of purpose and as a documentary–survey research in terms of nature and method. The research was conducted in 2022 within the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Tehran metropolis. The graph-based modeling and conflict analysis process consists of two main stages: modeling and conflict analysis.
In the first stage, the required information was collected through a documentary review of articles, plans, and all studies related to construction stakeholders in the metropolitan fringe. These materials were obtained from databases such as Scopus, Web of Science, Magiran, SID, Irandoc, and Noormags, as well as the search engines Google and Google Scholar. The study population consisted of actors involved in construction activities in the metropolitan fringe, including managers and experts from relevant organizations. The research began with purposive sampling and continued with theoretical sampling, resulting in 20 interviews.
The credibility and dependability of the results were ensured using the Guba and Lincoln method. Four criteria including credibility, dependability, confirmability, and transferability were examined. To enhance data validity, various strategies such as participant validation and peer debriefing were applied. Data analysis was performed using content analysis. From the total set of identified states, those that were impossible to occur were removed, and the states each decision-maker could reach from any initial state were determined. The possible states of the conflict were then ranked according to the actors’ preferences.
After completing the modeling process, the second stage involved using the results in the GMCR+ software. In this stage, stable states were identified for each group of actors, followed by the equilibrium points (probable outcomes) of the conflict. The actors involved in construction activities within the metropolitan fringe were classified into three main groups: (1) policy-making institutions; (2) supervisory institutions; and (3) executive institutions.
Findings
Actors and Their Possible Options
The components of the conflict model in the graph-based approach included the fringe-construction actors, their possible options, and their preferences. In all tables of the results section, the selection of an option by an actor is indicated as “Yes,” and the non-selection as “No.” Based on the final refined options for actors involved in construction within the metropolitan fringe, the total theoretical number of game states equals
Identification of Feasible States
Not every theoretically possible state can occur in reality, as several limitations reduced the number of valid states. Thus, combinations in which options cannot coexist were removed, as well as cases where each actor was required to select at least one of its options, or cases in which one action is conditional upon another.
After applying incompatibility conditions and the requirement of selecting at least one option in the GMCR+ software, the infeasible states were identified. Removing these states reduced the total number of feasible conflict states to 42.
Prioritizing Feasible States for Each Actor
The final step in modeling was ranking the feasible states for each decision-maker using the option-prioritization method. After entering these preferences into the software, the feasible states were ranked for all actors, and their validity was confirmed.
Determining Stable States
After constructing the model, the final outcomes were predicted based on stability and equilibrium analyses. A state was considered an equilibrium if it is stable for all actors. Such states represented the most probable outcomes of the conflict.
Summary of Equilibrium States
The conflict included several equilibrium states. The most important are summarized below:
State 4
According to the Nash stability, general metarationality, symmetric metarationality, sequential stability, limited-move stability, and farsighted stability criteria, State 4 was a stable equilibrium.
This state reflected the status quo: All actors maintain current practices. The only distinction was that supervisory institutions did not remain indifferent to land-use changes in the fringe area. One practical reason for the failure of reforms was that all actors remained stable in the current configuration and therefore had no incentive to move away from the existing situation.
State 19
Also considered an equilibrium under all stability criteria.
Similar to State 4, but with two differences:
- Supervisory institutions were not indifferent to land-use changes.
- Executive institutions accepted continuous presence of qualified executors and implementation of reforms.
A stable equilibrium under all logics of stability. However, this state provided minimum benefits for supervisory institutions.
States 32 and 37
Both states were equilibrium under all stability logics. They differed in terms of:
- Urban development control in the fringe
- Prevention of informal construction
- Continuous presence of qualified executors
State 38 (Optimal Equilibrium)
This was the most beneficial state for all actors, meeting all stability criteria.
In this state:
- Policy-making institutions adopted structural reforms, gradual changes, and coordinated, efficient governance of fringe-development policies.
- Supervisory institutions actively controlled urban development and prevent informal construction.
- Executive institutions ensured continuous presence of qualified agents and implement construction processes both in deteriorated urban areas and within the fringe.
States 3, 13, 14, 18, 35, and 36
These were equilibrium under general and symmetric metarationality. They represented moderately forward-looking states characterized by risk aversion and strategic retreat.
Discussion
The present study was conducted with the aim of analyzing institutional structures governing construction processes in the fringe of the Tehran metropolis based on a game-theoretic approach. In urban fringe areas, unregulated construction activities and in some cases the proximity of rural settlements to urban and peri-urban zones [Brohi et al., 2018] have led to the degradation of surrounding lands [Zhang et al., 2011] and severe land-use changes [Sorace & Hurst, 2015]. Consequently, such patterns of growth contribute to the outward expansion of cities and the encroachment upon and degradation of urban boundaries [Sobhani et al., 2019].
Two principles should be acknowledged in fringe development: preventing the conversion of natural lands into artificial environments, and ensuring that any limited construction contributes to environmental enhancement and the improvement of ecological capacities. In Iran, the system for directing and controlling urban construction is shaped by social, legal, and planning structures. Accordingly, construction governance is formed through: (1) various plans and planning documents, and (2) legal and financial instruments of urban planning [Moshiri, 2011].
By outlining and applying game theory to institutional structures of construction governance, this study not only addressed the complexity created by the multiplicity of actors, but through modeling, it analyzed their behaviors, interactions, and preferences to identify the implications of their strategic decisions. Game theory not only offers insights into interactive decision-making in strategic interactions but can also identify optimal pathways using graph theory, allowing all players to achieve maximum relative benefits [Lee, 2012].
The modeling results indicate that among the 42 feasible states, six equilibrium states and six semi-stable states emerged. State 38 was identified as the most stable configuration among actors involved in construction processes in the Tehran metropolitan fringe. In this state, all actors achieve maximum utility. Specifically:
– Policy-making institutions achieve structural reforms, gradual changes, and the need for revising regulations aligned with coordinated and efficient management of fringe policies;
– Regulatory institutions ensure control of urban development, prevention of unauthorized construction, and mitigation of informal expansion relative to current fringe policies;
– Executive institutions ensure continuous involvement of competent executors in construction processes within deteriorated urban areas and underutilized lands, fully implementing redevelopment and contributing to the governance of Tehran’s metropolitan fringe.
The findings indicate that the desirability, stability, and equilibrium envisioned for the metropolitan fringe are not evident in the current landscape of actors and their interactions. Achieving a preferred state, one that satisfies the priorities and preferences of stakeholders, requires fundamental and challenging actions.
The state identified as the most stable equilibrium depends on structural reforms and a clear conceptualization of fringe construction within Iran’s political–administrative system, supported by the collaboration of other influential institutions. Consistent with the results of this study, Alian et al. [2018; 2019], Falahati et al. [2017], and Shakkiba et al. [2020] have also emphasized the need for structural reforms in order to modify stakeholder preferences.
Conclusion
Coalitional analyses of the institutions indicate that achieving an institutional structure in this metropolis that maximizes the interests of all actors requires fundamental structural reforms. Such reforms must be oriented toward environmental protection, enhanced coordination capacity, alignment with higher-level planning documents, capacity building, and the active participation of stakeholders.
Acknowledgments: None to declare.
Ethical Permission: No ethical issues to report.
Conflicts of Interest: This article is derived from the first author's doctoral dissertation, supervised by the second author and advised by the third author at the Science and Research Branch of Islamic Azad University.
Authors’ Contributions: Safaeipour Z (First Author), Principal Researcher/Discussion Writer (50%); Sarvar R (Second Author), Methodologist/Introduction Writer (25%); Ghorbanenejhad R (Third Author), Methodologist/Statistical Analyst (25%)
Funding: This research was conducted with the authors’ personal financial resources
Keywords:
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