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Received: 2021/09/20 | Accepted: 2021/11/16 | Published: 2022/03/11
Received: 2021/09/20 | Accepted: 2021/11/16 | Published: 2022/03/11
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Mostofi A, Sarvari H, Hanaee T, Mahdinia M. Identifying Urban Planning Incentive from the Perspective of the Private and Public Sector for the Formation of Public-Private Partnership in Mashhad. GeoRes 2022; 37 (1) :91-99
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1- Department of Urban Planning and design, Mashhad Branch, Islamic Azad University, Mashhad, Iran
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Introduction
The city of Mashhad annually hosts a large number of pilgrims due to the presence of the holy shrine of Imam Reza (AS). The significance of this sacred shrine, together with Mashhad’s position as the second most populous city after Tehran, has made the provision of services and the development of appropriate infrastructure a highly critical issue in this city. On the other hand, the creation of services and infrastructure in Mashhad, owing to its scale, complexity, and high costs, cannot be achieved solely by urban management; therefore, cooperation between the public and private sectors becomes essential. In this regard, good urban governance emphasizes the importance of the private sector as one of the main stakeholders alongside the public sector [Ullah, 2014]. Moreover, without cooperation between governmental institutions and organizations and private-sector entrepreneurs and investors, the implementation of large-scale and infrastructure projects would not be feasible [Biygautane et al., 2019]. New Public Management likewise maintains that collaboration between the public and private sectors increases the commitment of public managers and minimizes errors on the part of the private sector [Heurkens & Homba, 2014]. In this context, the formation of public–private partnerships requires the existence of shared interests between the two sectors. In fact, unless such mutual interests are realized, public–private partnerships cannot materialize [Hodge & Greve, 2017]. Accordingly, much of the existing literature has focused on the issue of benefit sharing.
Chang, in his study, addresses the distribution of benefits derived from entrepreneurship within public–private partnerships in the Beijing Metro Line 4 project [Chang, 2013]. In another study, Buckberg et al. discuss the selection of proposed models for profit and benefit sharing in public–private partnerships for infrastructure projects [Buckberg et al., 2015]. Oppio and Torrieri propose methods for allocating investment returns between the public and private sectors in complex partnerships [Oppio & Torrieri, 2016]. However, comparatively limited attention has been paid to the role of urban planning instruments, such as incentives, in generating the benefits required for public–private partnerships, particularly with regard to urban-scale issues.
The public sector consists of organizations administered by the government. At the local level, these include institutions such as the governorate, provincial government, Islamic city and county councils, municipalities, and other organizations [Hoggett, 1991]. This sector intervenes in urban development with various objectives, including the provision of welfare, project implementation, the promotion of justice and equity, environmental protection, and the enhancement of urban aesthetics, among others [Carmona, 2016]. The private sector comprises diverse organizations with different motivations and interests. Financial and insurance institutions [Huff-Rousselle & Akuamoah-Boateng, 1998], investors [Adair et al., 1999], banks, construction firms, landowners, developers, building occupants, professional designers, and contractors [Zhang, 2005] are among the actors in this sector. The private sector possesses various capacities, such as persuading key actors (e.g., government bodies and local associations), influencing the housing market (particularly in housing regeneration projects), creativity in devising solutions, familiarity with revenue-generation mechanisms, and the identification and management of financial risks [Boxmeer & Becckhoven, 2005]. Public–private partnership is thus conceptualized as a mode of close cooperation between the public and private sectors [Hodge & Greve, 2007].
Three models can be identified for public–private partnerships. The first is known as the synergy model, in which the integration of capabilities and assets from both the public and private sectors is of paramount importance. This model is based on joint cooperation to create additional value. Such synergy emerges when two or more partners collaborate to achieve a common goal, and it also allows for initiative in developing new policies or solutions. The second model is the transformation model, wherein the private sector seeks to introduce its own concerns into the public sector in order to marketize it and ensure efficiency. Conversely, the public sector attempts to encourage the private sector to engage in socially oriented activities with long-term objectives. The third model is the budget-expansion model, in which the public sector faces financial constraints, while the private sector is aware of opportunities but requires public subsidies to reduce or overcome risks. In this model, one or both parties need financial resources, and each may attempt to obtain them from the other. Budget manipulation or risk transfer is a common feature of the third model [Mackintosh, 1992]. In addition to these partnership models, other studies have examined the application domains of public–private partnerships and the roles of the public and private sectors within them. Dupont et al. highlight the position of the private sector in public–private partnerships for long-term investment related to smart growth [Dupont et al., 2015]. Another study investigates the adaptation of public–private partnerships for affordable housing development by the private sector [Nyein & Hadikusumo, 2021]. Chirl-Ho also examines the construction of public buildings through public–private partnerships as a means of reducing the financial burden on the public sector [Chirl-Ho, 2018].
In public–private partnerships, incentives are widely used. Incentives may encourage certain behaviors or discourage others and are generally applicable rather than targeted at a specific sector’s behavior [Schneider & Ingram, 1990]. Vitale argues that effective incentives in urban development should either reduce costs or increase the income of stakeholder groups [Vitale, 2010]. Incentives employed in public–private partnerships take various forms. Ilgenstein introduces a wide range of incentives, including measures that enhance satisfaction with partnerships and increase investment, as well as actions that reduce public-sector borrowing, improve efficiency, and lower costs [Ilgenstein, 2022]. In another classification, Carmona suggests that incentives in urban development can be broadly categorized into four groups: management processes, rewards, subsidies, and direct investment [Carmona, 2016].
Legal incentives used in partnerships address issues such as tax exemptions [Golubchikov, 2004], loan provision, and facilities related to land allocation and land swapping [De Clerck & Demeulemeester, 2016; Schifnagel Avrichir, 2018]. Incentives associated with construction and infrastructure projects focus on cost-reduction mechanisms [Yang et al., 2019]. Managerial incentives relate to the delegation of political authority [Li, 2011] and the resolution of problems through negotiation and dialogue with stakeholders [Ditmar & Falk, 2016]. Organizational incentives address the elimination of excessive bureaucracy and regulations, leverage policies [Ditmar & Falk, 2016], process simplification, and guarantees aimed at reducing risk [Ika Wahyuni et al., 2019; Averkieva, 2017]. The most closely related studies in urban planning consider planning incentives to include measures such as granting special development density, creating revenue-generating land uses, or providing operational concessions [Carmona et al., 2017]. Other planning incentives include Business Improvement Districts, where improved place-making creates favorable conditions for investment. Such investments attract more people for employment and consumption and can even transform the mental image of neighborhoods facing socio-economic problems. These incentives are not applied universally and are primarily used in areas with social challenges and safety concerns [Lee, 2015; Richer & Lessen, 2018].
Existing research has largely focused on issues such as the application domains of public–private partnerships and the necessity and advantages of employing this form of collaboration. With regard to incentives used in public–private partnerships, most studies emphasize legal, regulatory, and organizational incentives, whereas the actions and proposals of urban planners directly affect the interests of both the public and private sectors. Few studies have sought to identify effective planning incentives in public–private partnerships. Even the most closely related urban planning research has been limited to general notions such as revenue-generating land uses, special density allowances, operational concessions, and place-making, without addressing the impacts of these measures on the interests of the public and private sectors. The main problem, therefore, lies in the absence of a coherent and detailed framework that systematically introduces urban planning incentives in public–private partnerships. Given that planners’ actions and proposals significantly influence urban development, raising planners’ awareness of instruments that secure the interests of both sectors, and incorporating these instruments into practice, can facilitate public–private partnerships. Accordingly, the aim of this article is to identify incentives that are simultaneously agreed upon by both the public and private sectors.
Methodology
This study, with a developmental nature, a qualitative approach, and a content analysis strategy, was conducted in the city of Mashhad in 2020. A total of 11 participants were selected through purposive, non-random sampling, including six municipal experts representing the public sector and five urban investors representing the private sector. The selected public-sector interviewees were all senior municipal experts with more than eight years of professional experience in collaboration with the municipality. The selected private-sector investors also had at least ten years of experience in urban development investment in Mashhad.
Mashhad, the capital of Razavi Khorasan Province, is located in northeastern Iran and covers an area of 35,147 hectares. According to the 2016 national census, the population of the city is approximately 3,576,379. Due to the presence of the holy shrine of Imam Reza (AS) and other tourist attractions, the city annually hosts about 20 million visitors [www.amar.org.ir, 2017]. Owing to its large spatial extent, high population, and the need for more effective planning, Mashhad has been divided into seven planning zones. These planning zones are not homogeneous. The highest population density is found in the eastern central zone, while the western central and southwestern zones exhibit the most favorable socio-economic conditions, and the northeastern zone is characterized by less favorable conditions. Currently, public–private partnerships in Mashhad are mainly formed in relation to urban development plans through non-planning incentives, and their spatial distribution across the city is limited and scattered.
Data were collected through semi-structured interviews with the aim of analyzing urban planning incentives in public–private partnerships. The interviews continued until theoretical saturation was achieved. The main interview questions for both public and private sectors focused on benefit provision and benefit generation mechanisms in public–private partnerships, including types of development and investment incentives that contribute to successful partnerships.
The audio files of the interviews with public- and private-sector participants were transcribed into text as soon as possible after completion. Data organization and coding were conducted manually. The codes were examined using an inductive (data-driven) approach, based on the manifest meanings of the data. Content analysis was conducted in two stages. In the first stage, subcoding was applied. This coding approach was employed for the first time in the present study to analyze public–private partnerships. Subcoding is used to break down broad themes into more detailed components and to generate fine-grained categorization [Saldana, 2016]. Through this process, planning incentives were identified from the overarching theme of benefit provision and benefit generation mechanisms. In the second stage, attribute coding was applied. Attribute coding was used to generate categories from the subcodes and to examine the reasons each subcode was considered an incentive from the perspectives of the public and private sectors. Finally, the findings were compared with insights from the theoretical literature.
To assess the reliability of the coding process, the test–retest method was employed. The results indicated an overall coding reliability of 84%, which suggests an acceptable level of reliability.
Findings
Among the interviewees, 54.55% were expert municipal officials and 45.45% were investors. Overall, 27% of the respondents held a PhD, 54% a master’s degree, and 18% a bachelor’s degree.
To analyze the interviews, sub-coding was employed in the first step. Through sub-coding, planning-related drivers that generate benefits in public–private partnerships (PPPs) were extracted. Line-by-line analysis and close examination of the interview texts resulted in the identification of 110 initial codes. Of these, 50 codes were derived from interviews with the public sector (45.5%) and 60 codes from interviews with the private sector (54.5%). These initial codes were then compared, and after examining their similarities and differences, they were organized into 29 sub-code categories, including: temporal flexibility (adaptability of space and buildings to future changes, multifunctional buildings); efficient accessibility (development of first-order arterial roads, ease of vehicular and pedestrian movement, proximity to main arteries); adequate infrastructure (wastewater collection, responsiveness to temporary needs); land use (appropriate location, target user groups, extended operating hours, types of profit-oriented land uses, type and importance of activities, building floors, building density, complementary land uses); appropriate siting (efficient public transportation, adjacency to supra-scale land uses, desirable views and vistas); place-making (seating spaces, desirable façades, spatial lighting, landscape design with green spaces); physical flexibility (diversity of building typologies, minimum parcel size); and spatial flexibility (hosting exhibitions, holding events, reuse of parking spaces). It should be noted that other drivers, such as investment facilitation, administrative procedures, and inter-organizational coordination, were also mentioned in the interviews; however, since the focus of this study was on planning-related drivers, these issues were not examined.
In coding the public-sector interviews, five categories were identified: temporal flexibility, efficient accessibility, adequate infrastructure, land use, and appropriate siting. In contrast, coding of the private-sector interviews yielded seven categories: temporal flexibility, spatial flexibility, physical flexibility, efficient accessibility, appropriate siting, land use, and place-making. Some sub-codes, such as temporal flexibility, efficient accessibility, land use, and appropriate siting, were common to both public and private sectors; however, each referred to different aspects of the subject. For example, in public-sector interviews, the land-use sub-code addressed issues such as operating hours, target groups, and appropriate location, whereas in private-sector interviews it referred to building density, type of land use, type of activity, and complementary land uses.
In the second step, axial coding was applied. This coding approach aimed to classify the sub-codes while also identifying the reasons underlying the motivating role of each extracted proposition. Through this process, the number of sub-codes was reduced to five main categories. The results of axial coding indicate that most of the planning-related drivers discussed in PPPs are associated with profit generation. However, a category such as creating a suitable environment shows a weaker connection to profit-making; the sub-codes within this category were articulated solely from the public-sector perspective. Conversely, categories such as increasing beneficiaries and users, increasing land and building values, and enabling indirect profitability were jointly emphasized by both public and private sectors in PPPs. The category of increasing beneficiaries and users refers to considerations that, when observed, attract a larger audience to the area. Similarly, the category of enabling indirect profitability encompasses issues that provide favorable conditions for attracting diverse social and economic groups. Another jointly emphasized category is the increase in land and building values, which refers to a specific form of benefit attainable only through the sale of property. In contrast, direct profitability was mentioned exclusively by the private sector; this category refers to profits that can be obtained directly, typically in the form of rental income or cash receipts.
Among the derived sub-codes, temporal flexibility and appropriate siting were found to be more important than the others. These codes are broader in scope, and their provision enhances the efficiency and performance of other codes such as spatial flexibility, place-making, land use, and related factors.
The findings of this study indicate that urban planning drivers in public–private partnerships can be classified into three categories:
Discussion
The primary objective of this article was to develop a systematic framework for planning-related drivers in public–private partnerships (PPPs). Achieving this goal required examining how benefits are provided and generated in PPPs through planning instruments such as land use, accessibility factors, urban landscape, and physical form. Accordingly, this section discusses the findings of the study regarding planning-related drivers in PPPs.
Public–private partnerships and their fields of application.
As previously noted, numerous studies have addressed the application of PPPs in urban issues such as smart urban growth, housing development, infrastructure provision, and the construction of new buildings and facilities [Dupont et al., 2015; Nyein & Hadikusumo, 2021]. While confirming the achievements of previous scholars and emphasizing the role of PPPs in urban development, the results of this study also highlight the application of planning-related drivers in the processes of urban planning and the preparation of urban development plans.
Public–private partnerships and benefits for the public and private sectors.
In the studies by Biygautane et al. [2019] and Chirl-Ho [2018], emphasis is placed on only one aspect involved in partnerships. The division of benefits derived from partnerships has also been discussed by Chang [2013], Buckberg et al. [2015], and Oppio and Torrieri [2016]. However, the findings of this article, while underscoring the importance of stakeholder groups and the issue of benefit, emphasize planning related drivers in relation to benefit generation for both the public and private sectors.
Public–private partnerships and planning-related drivers.
The findings of this research are fully consistent with those of Vitale [2010] and Ilgenstein [2022]. This article provides more detailed examples related to stakeholder revenues and increased investment. Moreover, in line with the literature reviewed in the introduction, planning-related drivers include the granting of special development rights, the creation of profit-oriented land uses, and the allocation of exploitation or development privileges [Carmona et al., 2017]. While confirming these points, the present findings further refine the notion of exploitation privileges by identifying more specific aspects, such as appropriate siting adjacent to desirable views and vistas, proximity to recreational land uses, and access to efficient public transportation. Other issues highlighted in the theoretical background include environmental qualities and place-making [Lee, 2015; Richer & Lessen, 2018]. Analysis of the interview codes confirms the place-making concept in the form of the sub-code place-making/space design. It should be noted, however, that in the theoretical literature environmental qualities are primarily considered as a key factor in changing the mental image of problematic areas, whereas in the conducted interviews, place-making was mainly emphasized as a factor ensuring greater user presence. Furthermore, none of the previous studies have addressed flexibility and efficient accessibility as planning-related drivers in PPPs.
Planning-related drivers and the roles of the public and private sectors.
Interview codes related to the implementation of urban projects, efficient accessibility, provision of adequate infrastructure, and place-making are aligned with Carmona’s discussion of public-sector intervention in urban development, such as welfare provision, project implementation, and the realization of aesthetic objectives [Carmona, 2016]. Similarly, the sub-codes of land use, physical flexibility, and spatial flexibility correspond to the objectives identified by Boxmeer and Becckhoven for private-sector involvement in urban development [Boxmeer & Becckhoven, 2005]. The findings regarding the objectives of the public and private sectors in partnerships are also consistent with the first and second models of PPPs proposed by Mackintosh [1992]. Urban development PPPs can be considered a hybrid of these two models; however, while those models are presented in general terms, the present study specifies issues in greater detail based on the objectives of the public and private sectors in urban development. Some of the issues raised in interviews, such as adopting smaller-than-standard parcel sizes for service land uses, constructing grade-separated intersections and bridges to improve connectivity between settlements on both sides of Mashhad’s ring road, and emphasizing spaces for hosting national and local ceremonies in accordance with pilgrims’ needs and the conditions of adjacent communities, are specific to the city of Mashhad and have not been addressed in previous studies. The findings of this research can be generalized to tourist-oriented metropolises, particularly those characterized by diverse social and economic groups and where financial provision and investment attractiveness are of critical importance.
It is recommended that future studies, based on the findings of this research, rank the status of Mashhad’s seven planning domains in terms of their utilization of effective planning-related drivers in PPPs, thereby providing more favorable conditions for PPPs in urban development plans. The main limitation of this study was the identification of expert professionals and investors, individuals with sufficient experience and familiarity with the diverse conditions of Mashhad’s metropolitan areas.
Conclusion
The results indicate that planning-related drivers used in urban development encompass a more detailed and broader range than merely the sale of development rights and general issues related to the creation of profit-oriented land uses and the granting of exploitation privileges. The findings are not limited to financial benefits and area profitability; rather, in line with the codes derived from interviews with the public sector, they also include factors influencing public satisfaction and the creation of a suitable environment. In PPPs, the private sector approaches the public sector primarily to generate profit, whereas the public sector seeks assistance from the private sector to achieve citizen satisfaction, create an appropriate environment, and support the fulfillment of its executive responsibilities. In this context, urban planners, given their pivotal role in PPPs must, through urban form components, create the conditions necessary for a suitable environment, direct profitability, and investment guarantees to ensure the generation of the benefits required in public–private partnerships.
Acknowledgments: We sincerely thank the experts from both the public and private sectors who collaborated with us in this study.
Ethical Permission: Not applicable.
Conflict of Interest: This article is derived from the first author’s doctoral dissertation entitled “Developing a Public–Private Partnership Model to Achieve the Feasibility of Urban Development Plans.”
Author Contributions: Mostofi A (First Author), Main Researcher (50%); Sarvari H (Second Author), Introduction Writer (30%); Hanaee H (Third Author), Methodologist (15%); Mahdinia MH (Fourth Author), Assistant Researcher (5%)
Funding: Research expenses were covered by the first author.
The city of Mashhad annually hosts a large number of pilgrims due to the presence of the holy shrine of Imam Reza (AS). The significance of this sacred shrine, together with Mashhad’s position as the second most populous city after Tehran, has made the provision of services and the development of appropriate infrastructure a highly critical issue in this city. On the other hand, the creation of services and infrastructure in Mashhad, owing to its scale, complexity, and high costs, cannot be achieved solely by urban management; therefore, cooperation between the public and private sectors becomes essential. In this regard, good urban governance emphasizes the importance of the private sector as one of the main stakeholders alongside the public sector [Ullah, 2014]. Moreover, without cooperation between governmental institutions and organizations and private-sector entrepreneurs and investors, the implementation of large-scale and infrastructure projects would not be feasible [Biygautane et al., 2019]. New Public Management likewise maintains that collaboration between the public and private sectors increases the commitment of public managers and minimizes errors on the part of the private sector [Heurkens & Homba, 2014]. In this context, the formation of public–private partnerships requires the existence of shared interests between the two sectors. In fact, unless such mutual interests are realized, public–private partnerships cannot materialize [Hodge & Greve, 2017]. Accordingly, much of the existing literature has focused on the issue of benefit sharing.
Chang, in his study, addresses the distribution of benefits derived from entrepreneurship within public–private partnerships in the Beijing Metro Line 4 project [Chang, 2013]. In another study, Buckberg et al. discuss the selection of proposed models for profit and benefit sharing in public–private partnerships for infrastructure projects [Buckberg et al., 2015]. Oppio and Torrieri propose methods for allocating investment returns between the public and private sectors in complex partnerships [Oppio & Torrieri, 2016]. However, comparatively limited attention has been paid to the role of urban planning instruments, such as incentives, in generating the benefits required for public–private partnerships, particularly with regard to urban-scale issues.
The public sector consists of organizations administered by the government. At the local level, these include institutions such as the governorate, provincial government, Islamic city and county councils, municipalities, and other organizations [Hoggett, 1991]. This sector intervenes in urban development with various objectives, including the provision of welfare, project implementation, the promotion of justice and equity, environmental protection, and the enhancement of urban aesthetics, among others [Carmona, 2016]. The private sector comprises diverse organizations with different motivations and interests. Financial and insurance institutions [Huff-Rousselle & Akuamoah-Boateng, 1998], investors [Adair et al., 1999], banks, construction firms, landowners, developers, building occupants, professional designers, and contractors [Zhang, 2005] are among the actors in this sector. The private sector possesses various capacities, such as persuading key actors (e.g., government bodies and local associations), influencing the housing market (particularly in housing regeneration projects), creativity in devising solutions, familiarity with revenue-generation mechanisms, and the identification and management of financial risks [Boxmeer & Becckhoven, 2005]. Public–private partnership is thus conceptualized as a mode of close cooperation between the public and private sectors [Hodge & Greve, 2007].
Three models can be identified for public–private partnerships. The first is known as the synergy model, in which the integration of capabilities and assets from both the public and private sectors is of paramount importance. This model is based on joint cooperation to create additional value. Such synergy emerges when two or more partners collaborate to achieve a common goal, and it also allows for initiative in developing new policies or solutions. The second model is the transformation model, wherein the private sector seeks to introduce its own concerns into the public sector in order to marketize it and ensure efficiency. Conversely, the public sector attempts to encourage the private sector to engage in socially oriented activities with long-term objectives. The third model is the budget-expansion model, in which the public sector faces financial constraints, while the private sector is aware of opportunities but requires public subsidies to reduce or overcome risks. In this model, one or both parties need financial resources, and each may attempt to obtain them from the other. Budget manipulation or risk transfer is a common feature of the third model [Mackintosh, 1992]. In addition to these partnership models, other studies have examined the application domains of public–private partnerships and the roles of the public and private sectors within them. Dupont et al. highlight the position of the private sector in public–private partnerships for long-term investment related to smart growth [Dupont et al., 2015]. Another study investigates the adaptation of public–private partnerships for affordable housing development by the private sector [Nyein & Hadikusumo, 2021]. Chirl-Ho also examines the construction of public buildings through public–private partnerships as a means of reducing the financial burden on the public sector [Chirl-Ho, 2018].
In public–private partnerships, incentives are widely used. Incentives may encourage certain behaviors or discourage others and are generally applicable rather than targeted at a specific sector’s behavior [Schneider & Ingram, 1990]. Vitale argues that effective incentives in urban development should either reduce costs or increase the income of stakeholder groups [Vitale, 2010]. Incentives employed in public–private partnerships take various forms. Ilgenstein introduces a wide range of incentives, including measures that enhance satisfaction with partnerships and increase investment, as well as actions that reduce public-sector borrowing, improve efficiency, and lower costs [Ilgenstein, 2022]. In another classification, Carmona suggests that incentives in urban development can be broadly categorized into four groups: management processes, rewards, subsidies, and direct investment [Carmona, 2016].
Legal incentives used in partnerships address issues such as tax exemptions [Golubchikov, 2004], loan provision, and facilities related to land allocation and land swapping [De Clerck & Demeulemeester, 2016; Schifnagel Avrichir, 2018]. Incentives associated with construction and infrastructure projects focus on cost-reduction mechanisms [Yang et al., 2019]. Managerial incentives relate to the delegation of political authority [Li, 2011] and the resolution of problems through negotiation and dialogue with stakeholders [Ditmar & Falk, 2016]. Organizational incentives address the elimination of excessive bureaucracy and regulations, leverage policies [Ditmar & Falk, 2016], process simplification, and guarantees aimed at reducing risk [Ika Wahyuni et al., 2019; Averkieva, 2017]. The most closely related studies in urban planning consider planning incentives to include measures such as granting special development density, creating revenue-generating land uses, or providing operational concessions [Carmona et al., 2017]. Other planning incentives include Business Improvement Districts, where improved place-making creates favorable conditions for investment. Such investments attract more people for employment and consumption and can even transform the mental image of neighborhoods facing socio-economic problems. These incentives are not applied universally and are primarily used in areas with social challenges and safety concerns [Lee, 2015; Richer & Lessen, 2018].
Existing research has largely focused on issues such as the application domains of public–private partnerships and the necessity and advantages of employing this form of collaboration. With regard to incentives used in public–private partnerships, most studies emphasize legal, regulatory, and organizational incentives, whereas the actions and proposals of urban planners directly affect the interests of both the public and private sectors. Few studies have sought to identify effective planning incentives in public–private partnerships. Even the most closely related urban planning research has been limited to general notions such as revenue-generating land uses, special density allowances, operational concessions, and place-making, without addressing the impacts of these measures on the interests of the public and private sectors. The main problem, therefore, lies in the absence of a coherent and detailed framework that systematically introduces urban planning incentives in public–private partnerships. Given that planners’ actions and proposals significantly influence urban development, raising planners’ awareness of instruments that secure the interests of both sectors, and incorporating these instruments into practice, can facilitate public–private partnerships. Accordingly, the aim of this article is to identify incentives that are simultaneously agreed upon by both the public and private sectors.
Methodology
This study, with a developmental nature, a qualitative approach, and a content analysis strategy, was conducted in the city of Mashhad in 2020. A total of 11 participants were selected through purposive, non-random sampling, including six municipal experts representing the public sector and five urban investors representing the private sector. The selected public-sector interviewees were all senior municipal experts with more than eight years of professional experience in collaboration with the municipality. The selected private-sector investors also had at least ten years of experience in urban development investment in Mashhad.
Mashhad, the capital of Razavi Khorasan Province, is located in northeastern Iran and covers an area of 35,147 hectares. According to the 2016 national census, the population of the city is approximately 3,576,379. Due to the presence of the holy shrine of Imam Reza (AS) and other tourist attractions, the city annually hosts about 20 million visitors [www.amar.org.ir, 2017]. Owing to its large spatial extent, high population, and the need for more effective planning, Mashhad has been divided into seven planning zones. These planning zones are not homogeneous. The highest population density is found in the eastern central zone, while the western central and southwestern zones exhibit the most favorable socio-economic conditions, and the northeastern zone is characterized by less favorable conditions. Currently, public–private partnerships in Mashhad are mainly formed in relation to urban development plans through non-planning incentives, and their spatial distribution across the city is limited and scattered.
Data were collected through semi-structured interviews with the aim of analyzing urban planning incentives in public–private partnerships. The interviews continued until theoretical saturation was achieved. The main interview questions for both public and private sectors focused on benefit provision and benefit generation mechanisms in public–private partnerships, including types of development and investment incentives that contribute to successful partnerships.
The audio files of the interviews with public- and private-sector participants were transcribed into text as soon as possible after completion. Data organization and coding were conducted manually. The codes were examined using an inductive (data-driven) approach, based on the manifest meanings of the data. Content analysis was conducted in two stages. In the first stage, subcoding was applied. This coding approach was employed for the first time in the present study to analyze public–private partnerships. Subcoding is used to break down broad themes into more detailed components and to generate fine-grained categorization [Saldana, 2016]. Through this process, planning incentives were identified from the overarching theme of benefit provision and benefit generation mechanisms. In the second stage, attribute coding was applied. Attribute coding was used to generate categories from the subcodes and to examine the reasons each subcode was considered an incentive from the perspectives of the public and private sectors. Finally, the findings were compared with insights from the theoretical literature.
To assess the reliability of the coding process, the test–retest method was employed. The results indicated an overall coding reliability of 84%, which suggests an acceptable level of reliability.
Findings
Among the interviewees, 54.55% were expert municipal officials and 45.45% were investors. Overall, 27% of the respondents held a PhD, 54% a master’s degree, and 18% a bachelor’s degree.
To analyze the interviews, sub-coding was employed in the first step. Through sub-coding, planning-related drivers that generate benefits in public–private partnerships (PPPs) were extracted. Line-by-line analysis and close examination of the interview texts resulted in the identification of 110 initial codes. Of these, 50 codes were derived from interviews with the public sector (45.5%) and 60 codes from interviews with the private sector (54.5%). These initial codes were then compared, and after examining their similarities and differences, they were organized into 29 sub-code categories, including: temporal flexibility (adaptability of space and buildings to future changes, multifunctional buildings); efficient accessibility (development of first-order arterial roads, ease of vehicular and pedestrian movement, proximity to main arteries); adequate infrastructure (wastewater collection, responsiveness to temporary needs); land use (appropriate location, target user groups, extended operating hours, types of profit-oriented land uses, type and importance of activities, building floors, building density, complementary land uses); appropriate siting (efficient public transportation, adjacency to supra-scale land uses, desirable views and vistas); place-making (seating spaces, desirable façades, spatial lighting, landscape design with green spaces); physical flexibility (diversity of building typologies, minimum parcel size); and spatial flexibility (hosting exhibitions, holding events, reuse of parking spaces). It should be noted that other drivers, such as investment facilitation, administrative procedures, and inter-organizational coordination, were also mentioned in the interviews; however, since the focus of this study was on planning-related drivers, these issues were not examined.
In coding the public-sector interviews, five categories were identified: temporal flexibility, efficient accessibility, adequate infrastructure, land use, and appropriate siting. In contrast, coding of the private-sector interviews yielded seven categories: temporal flexibility, spatial flexibility, physical flexibility, efficient accessibility, appropriate siting, land use, and place-making. Some sub-codes, such as temporal flexibility, efficient accessibility, land use, and appropriate siting, were common to both public and private sectors; however, each referred to different aspects of the subject. For example, in public-sector interviews, the land-use sub-code addressed issues such as operating hours, target groups, and appropriate location, whereas in private-sector interviews it referred to building density, type of land use, type of activity, and complementary land uses.
In the second step, axial coding was applied. This coding approach aimed to classify the sub-codes while also identifying the reasons underlying the motivating role of each extracted proposition. Through this process, the number of sub-codes was reduced to five main categories. The results of axial coding indicate that most of the planning-related drivers discussed in PPPs are associated with profit generation. However, a category such as creating a suitable environment shows a weaker connection to profit-making; the sub-codes within this category were articulated solely from the public-sector perspective. Conversely, categories such as increasing beneficiaries and users, increasing land and building values, and enabling indirect profitability were jointly emphasized by both public and private sectors in PPPs. The category of increasing beneficiaries and users refers to considerations that, when observed, attract a larger audience to the area. Similarly, the category of enabling indirect profitability encompasses issues that provide favorable conditions for attracting diverse social and economic groups. Another jointly emphasized category is the increase in land and building values, which refers to a specific form of benefit attainable only through the sale of property. In contrast, direct profitability was mentioned exclusively by the private sector; this category refers to profits that can be obtained directly, typically in the form of rental income or cash receipts.
Among the derived sub-codes, temporal flexibility and appropriate siting were found to be more important than the others. These codes are broader in scope, and their provision enhances the efficiency and performance of other codes such as spatial flexibility, place-making, land use, and related factors.
The findings of this study indicate that urban planning drivers in public–private partnerships can be classified into three categories:
- The first category comprises planning-related drivers that encourage the public sector to engage in partnerships. By considering these drivers, the influential factors in partnerships from the public-sector perspective are addressed. The constituent sub-codes include temporal flexibility and adequate infrastructure, which together form a key category titled creating a suitable environment.
- The second category includes planning-related drivers that encourage the private sector to participate in partnerships. Incorporating these drivers ensures the profitability sought by the private sector. This category includes the sub-codes of spatial flexibility and land use, which collectively give rise to the category enabling direct profitability.
- The third category encompasses issues of shared concern to both public and private sectors in partnerships. These drivers address common interests and include codes such as land use, temporal flexibility, place-making, appropriate siting, efficient accessibility, and physical flexibility. The combination of these codes provides the necessary guarantees for investment from the perspective of urban planning.
Discussion
The primary objective of this article was to develop a systematic framework for planning-related drivers in public–private partnerships (PPPs). Achieving this goal required examining how benefits are provided and generated in PPPs through planning instruments such as land use, accessibility factors, urban landscape, and physical form. Accordingly, this section discusses the findings of the study regarding planning-related drivers in PPPs.
Public–private partnerships and their fields of application.
As previously noted, numerous studies have addressed the application of PPPs in urban issues such as smart urban growth, housing development, infrastructure provision, and the construction of new buildings and facilities [Dupont et al., 2015; Nyein & Hadikusumo, 2021]. While confirming the achievements of previous scholars and emphasizing the role of PPPs in urban development, the results of this study also highlight the application of planning-related drivers in the processes of urban planning and the preparation of urban development plans.
Public–private partnerships and benefits for the public and private sectors.
In the studies by Biygautane et al. [2019] and Chirl-Ho [2018], emphasis is placed on only one aspect involved in partnerships. The division of benefits derived from partnerships has also been discussed by Chang [2013], Buckberg et al. [2015], and Oppio and Torrieri [2016]. However, the findings of this article, while underscoring the importance of stakeholder groups and the issue of benefit, emphasize planning related drivers in relation to benefit generation for both the public and private sectors.
Public–private partnerships and planning-related drivers.
The findings of this research are fully consistent with those of Vitale [2010] and Ilgenstein [2022]. This article provides more detailed examples related to stakeholder revenues and increased investment. Moreover, in line with the literature reviewed in the introduction, planning-related drivers include the granting of special development rights, the creation of profit-oriented land uses, and the allocation of exploitation or development privileges [Carmona et al., 2017]. While confirming these points, the present findings further refine the notion of exploitation privileges by identifying more specific aspects, such as appropriate siting adjacent to desirable views and vistas, proximity to recreational land uses, and access to efficient public transportation. Other issues highlighted in the theoretical background include environmental qualities and place-making [Lee, 2015; Richer & Lessen, 2018]. Analysis of the interview codes confirms the place-making concept in the form of the sub-code place-making/space design. It should be noted, however, that in the theoretical literature environmental qualities are primarily considered as a key factor in changing the mental image of problematic areas, whereas in the conducted interviews, place-making was mainly emphasized as a factor ensuring greater user presence. Furthermore, none of the previous studies have addressed flexibility and efficient accessibility as planning-related drivers in PPPs.
Planning-related drivers and the roles of the public and private sectors.
Interview codes related to the implementation of urban projects, efficient accessibility, provision of adequate infrastructure, and place-making are aligned with Carmona’s discussion of public-sector intervention in urban development, such as welfare provision, project implementation, and the realization of aesthetic objectives [Carmona, 2016]. Similarly, the sub-codes of land use, physical flexibility, and spatial flexibility correspond to the objectives identified by Boxmeer and Becckhoven for private-sector involvement in urban development [Boxmeer & Becckhoven, 2005]. The findings regarding the objectives of the public and private sectors in partnerships are also consistent with the first and second models of PPPs proposed by Mackintosh [1992]. Urban development PPPs can be considered a hybrid of these two models; however, while those models are presented in general terms, the present study specifies issues in greater detail based on the objectives of the public and private sectors in urban development. Some of the issues raised in interviews, such as adopting smaller-than-standard parcel sizes for service land uses, constructing grade-separated intersections and bridges to improve connectivity between settlements on both sides of Mashhad’s ring road, and emphasizing spaces for hosting national and local ceremonies in accordance with pilgrims’ needs and the conditions of adjacent communities, are specific to the city of Mashhad and have not been addressed in previous studies. The findings of this research can be generalized to tourist-oriented metropolises, particularly those characterized by diverse social and economic groups and where financial provision and investment attractiveness are of critical importance.
It is recommended that future studies, based on the findings of this research, rank the status of Mashhad’s seven planning domains in terms of their utilization of effective planning-related drivers in PPPs, thereby providing more favorable conditions for PPPs in urban development plans. The main limitation of this study was the identification of expert professionals and investors, individuals with sufficient experience and familiarity with the diverse conditions of Mashhad’s metropolitan areas.
Conclusion
The results indicate that planning-related drivers used in urban development encompass a more detailed and broader range than merely the sale of development rights and general issues related to the creation of profit-oriented land uses and the granting of exploitation privileges. The findings are not limited to financial benefits and area profitability; rather, in line with the codes derived from interviews with the public sector, they also include factors influencing public satisfaction and the creation of a suitable environment. In PPPs, the private sector approaches the public sector primarily to generate profit, whereas the public sector seeks assistance from the private sector to achieve citizen satisfaction, create an appropriate environment, and support the fulfillment of its executive responsibilities. In this context, urban planners, given their pivotal role in PPPs must, through urban form components, create the conditions necessary for a suitable environment, direct profitability, and investment guarantees to ensure the generation of the benefits required in public–private partnerships.
Acknowledgments: We sincerely thank the experts from both the public and private sectors who collaborated with us in this study.
Ethical Permission: Not applicable.
Conflict of Interest: This article is derived from the first author’s doctoral dissertation entitled “Developing a Public–Private Partnership Model to Achieve the Feasibility of Urban Development Plans.”
Author Contributions: Mostofi A (First Author), Main Researcher (50%); Sarvari H (Second Author), Introduction Writer (30%); Hanaee H (Third Author), Methodologist (15%); Mahdinia MH (Fourth Author), Assistant Researcher (5%)
Funding: Research expenses were covered by the first author.
Keywords:
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